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Introduction
Models with adverse selection (Akerlof (1970) ) have enhanced our understanding of many economic phenomena. They offer both positive and normative explanations on problems that may arise due to asymmetric information, such as the lemons problem in the automobile market (Genesove (1993) ), market institutions such as expert certiÞers (Biglaiser (1993) ), screening by Þrms and employers (Cooper (1984) , Moore (1985) ), design of optimal regulatory mechanisms ( Baron and Myerson (1982) , Laffont and Tirole (1986) ), etc. In fact, the methodology of including a set of incentive compatibility constraints in a model of asymmetric information has become a standard tool of economic analysis. As we discuss below, while the standard models have been useful, they are not rich enough to cover many recent trends in the marketplace. In particular, we address how adverse selection affects economic activities that take place across several markets.
Obviously, the standard model can be applied to models with many markets when adverse selection problems occur independently in these markets. Nevertheless, how can it be applied when economic agents' private information is correlated ? In this paper, we provide a framework to answer this problem. We address questions such as the following: Will correlation between consumers' preferences on multiple goods and costs cause these goods to be supplied in a bundle or separately? How does industry structure affect the way Þrms compete when adverse selection is characterized by correlated private information? How does correlation affect distortions in quality or quantity and welfare?
We illustrate adverse selection and correlation by current developments in the health and education markets. Recent changes in the health care industry include not only those that scholars of industrial organization commonly think are important (such as horizontal and vertical mergers, entry and exit by Þrms, as well as explicit and implicit contracts), but also a new innovation, called a carve out. Whereas a single insurance or managed-care company used to administer general and mental health care and substance abuse coverage for enrollees, now administration of these services may be handled by separate Þrms. The so-called mental health and substance abuse carve It has been argued that the main reason for a carve out is to solve moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 2 A carve out is different from most incentive mechanisms (such as cost sharing, price setting, spending caps, or quantity restrictions) in that it speciÞcally aims to change the structure of supply. Suppose that less healthy consumers value mental health and substance abuse services more than healthy ones, and it is less costly to supply healthier consumers both services.
Here, the correlation is between consumers' preferences for quality of health services and costs of supplying these services to them. Because the less healthy individuals value mental health services more, to avoid bad risks, Þrms may prefer to offer low quality coverage for mental health and substance abuse services. Under a carve out, mental health and substance abuse services are offered by Þrms that are not allowed to supply general health services. Given the development of carve outs, the following questions naturally arise: Will Þrms that cannot supply general health services have less of an incentive to discriminate against the consumers? Likewise, will the general health service suppliers discriminate less? Correlation is the key, but the standard model is inadequate for analyzing this precisely because it lacks a treatment on correlation between preferences on multiple goods and costs.
The second example is school choice. There has been a great deal of discussion by policy makers, academics, and pundits about this. There has also been some movement towards allowing students ßexibility in selecting which school they can attend. The state of Michigan enacted a school choice program in the early 1990s that created charter schools and allowed inter-district transfers. A primary concern of many education experts was that school choice "would attract the brightest students and those with the most involved parents," (New York Times October 26, 1999).
Nevertheless, this did not happened. According to David Arsen of Michigan State University, "We didn't Þnd the academic creaming so many people worried about.....what we found instead is creaming on the basis of costs." He goes on to say that "The charter schools were generally taking the students who are cheapest to educate and leaving behind those who are most expensive." A study he conducted also showed that "about three-quarters of the charter schools offered no special services, and even the few that did enroll special needs students provided them with fewer and less expensive services than nearby public schools."
In the case of general and special education, correlation is the issue. A student who needs special education typically requires more attention in his general education classes; the cost of educating this type of students is higher. Moreover, parents of children who are less expensive to educate may not value special education as much as those parents whose children need special education.
When a school offers both general and special education programs, it may lower the quality of special education to dissuade the high cost students from enrolling. Will separating the special and general education programs in schools reduce creaming? Will it lead to higher efficiency in general or special education? Again, how does adverse selection affect the choice of supply structure?
Our model has two Þrms offering horizontally and vertically differentiated products. They compete by setting prices and quality levels for each of two goods. Consumers' preferences can be described by how much they value the quality of each good (the vertical dimension) and which Þrm they are naturally more inclined to visit (the horizontal dimension). In particular, all consumers have the same preferences regarding quality of the Þrst good, while one set of consumers values quality of the second good more than the other set of consumers. Firms' costs to supply a good at a given quality level depends on consumer types: consumers that value the second good's quality more are more costly for a Þrm to provide quality for each of the goods.
Two industry structures will be examined. The Þrst is integration. Each Þrm offers two goods as a bundle to sell to consumers. The second is separation. In this regime, a Þrm is only allowed to supply one good; no bundling is allowed and each of the two Þrms can be regarded as being split into two, each of which sells one of the two goods. These two regimes are regulatory choices; Þrms do not get to choose the regime in which they operate. Our focus is on how efficiently each of the market structures will perform in terms of quality provision and welfare. 3 For each of the two industry structures, we examine two different strategy spaces for the Þrms.
In the Þrst, Þrms offer a uniform quality for each good that they sell. We call this uniform price and quality competition. In both integration and separation regimes, the equilibrium quality of good 1 (for which consumers have identical preferences) is efficient for the overall population of consumers. This efficiency result is reminiscent of Spence (1975) : where consumers' marginal and average valuations for quality are identical (due to the linear demand functions used in this paper), Þrms' proÞt-maximizing behavior leads to efficient quality. For good 2 (for which some consumers value the quality higher than others), the equilibrium quality is inefficient. The Spence argument is invalidated by the correlation between (heterogenous) preferences and costs. Since low cost consumers have a lower marginal rate of substitution between quality of good 2 and income, to attract a better mix of consumers Þrms lower the good 2 quality from the efficient level in both integration and separation regimes.
To determine which regime results in more efficient good 2 quality, we identify two effects. The
Þrst is the cost effect. A Þrm has more incentive to raise the quality of good 2 when markets are separated because they avoid the higher cost of selling good 1 to the high cost consumers. The other effect is the purchase economies of scope effect. Separation changes the horizontal differentiation parameter. As a result, demand functions may become more responsive to both price and quality changes. This gives a Þrm a larger incentive to reduce the quality of good 2 to improve its mix of consumers. When the cost effect dominates the purchase economies of scope effect, then separation improves quality of good 2. If the reverse is true, then separation reduces the quality of good 2 to a lower level. We also show that when demand functions are relatively responsive to price and quality, welfare is typically higher when markets are separated; when demand is not very responsive, welfare may fall when markets are separated.
The second strategy space allows Þrms to offer multiple quality levels and prices for each gooda menu of price-quality pairs. We call this screening price and quality competition. Due to the possibility of screening, the usual incentive compatibility constraints will be used to derive the equilibria. We show that fully efficient qualities of both goods can arise in equilibrium under integration or separation: incentive constraints may not bind, with this more likely to occur under separated markets. If full efficiency is not possible in a regime, only the quality of good 2 will be inefficient; it will be too low in each regime. Both cost and purchase economies of scope effects can again be identiÞed when good 2 equilibrium qualities are compared across regimes and the same qualitative effect holds as in the uniform price and quality competition case. Furthermore, if demand is very responsive to changes in price and quality, welfare is typically higher when markets are separated, while the reverse is possible otherwise.
Many papers examine how a Þrm maximizes proÞts when it offers multiple goods. Adams and Yellen (1976) and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) show by examples that a monopolist may want to bundle goods rather than sell them separately. 4 This occurs even if demands are 4 For simplicity, we do not let a Þrm simultaneously offer packages that include both types of goods and independent. Papers on the optimal pricing policy by a multiproduct monopolist when consumers are characterized by a scalar parameter include Roberts (1979) and Mirman and Sibley (1980) . Wilson (1993) , Armstrong (1996) and Rochet and Chone (1998) analyze complex models where the multiproduct monopolist faces consumers of multidimensional types and where the consumer's type is drawn from a continuous space. In each of these papers, there is no adverse selection problem since the cost of providing a good is independent of a consumer's preferences and the Þrm faces no competition.
Our work is related to papers studying whether a multiproduct buyer would prefer to make purchases from a different seller for each good or from a single seller for all goods. Baron and Besanko (1992) and Gilbert and Riordan (1995) deal with contracts that are made before the sellers have private information, while in Baron and Besanko (1999) sellers have private information before contracting. 5 Our screening price and quality competition model is most closely related to the later Baron and Besanko paper, since consumers have private information before they purchase.
The key methodological difference between our paper and this literature is that their sellers have independent cost draws.
Epple and Romano (1998) study an education model where tuition-free public schools compete with proÞt-maximizing, tuition-Þnanced private schools. The students have different abilities and incomes. Epple and Romano assume that a student's peers affect his achievement. They show that there is sorting on the basis of ability and income where more able students go to private schools. In our paper, there are no peer effects. If peer effects were present in our model, then there would be creaming both on the basis of talent and costs. SpeciÞcally, gifted students would get discounts as in Epple and Romano or the quality of gifted programs would be high, and students with learning disabilities would be discouraged from attending private schools which offer substandard special education programs.
Our results have a connection to the multi-task principal agent models of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) . In these models, the principal must take into account how changing the agent's compensation on one task affects the agent's effort across tasks. The principal often will have to balance the agent's incentives. One implication of this work is that if there are no economies separate packages for each good individually -the mixed bundling case. of scope among tasks, then it is more efficient to have different agents complete different tasks. That is, carve outs increase efficiencies.
In Section 2, we present the basic model. We then analyze the model in Section 3 when Þrms can only choose one quality level for each good that they produce. In Section 4, we allow the Þrms to choose multiple quality levels for each good that they offer. We conclude in Section 5.
The Model
We now present our model. There is a continuum of consumers; each consumer would like to buy one unit of good 1 and one unit of good 2. Consumers are described by two random variables: valuation of a unit of quality of good 2 is described by v; that is, it is either v L or v H . The valuation of quality deÞnes "vertical" preferences on the goods. On the other hand, the random variable x describes "horizontal" preferences on the goods, as in a Hotelling model. Sometimes we will use the terms "a v i consumer," and "a consumer at x."
Each consumer buys from one of two Þrms, Firm A and Firm B. 7 In different regimes, these Þrms may be allowed to supply one or both goods. Suppose that each Þrm sells both goods 1 and 2 at a total price of P . If the price at Firm k, k = A, B, is P k while the qualities of goods 1 and 2 at Firm k are respectively q k 1 and q k 2 , then a consumer gets utilities
purchasing from Firms A and B, respectively, where t measures the strength of the preference deÞned by x, and where v = v L , v H . In other words, the Þrms can be thought of as located at the 6 We assume throughout that θ is sufficiently small so that qualities and prices are always positive. This type of assumption is used in the incomplete-information monopoly regulation literature (see Laffont and Tirole (1986) for example) to guarantee that the monopolist never is shut down by the regulator.
ends of a line of unit length and consumers are uniformly distributed on the line; the parameter t is often interpreted as the unit transportation cost. The Þrms cannot identify a consumer's characteristic x or valuation parameters v L and v H .
If the goods are not bundled, each must be purchased from a different Þrm. In this case, imagine that each of the Firms A and B as being split into two. A consumer buying these two goods from the Þrms located at point 0 obtains utility
if she buys the goods from the Þrms located at 1, her utility is
where P k 1 and P k 2 are the prices of goods 1 and 2 at Firm k, k = A, B.
We allow the horizontal preference parameters, t and s, to be different depending on whether the goods are bundled or not. One possibility is t = s. If one uses the "distance" interpretation of the preference parameter, then a consumer incurs twice the travel cost to obtain the goods when they are sold separately compared to when they are bundled. Another possibility is t = 2s. Here, the total transportation cost is the same whether the goods are bundled or not. These possibilities can be given a "purchase scope economies" interpretation: a consumer may or may not be able to save on transactions cost when the goods are bundled. The Þrst possibility, t = s, refers to complete scope economies, whereas the second refers to the absence of economies. A more natural scenario may be 2s > t > s so that economies of scope exist, but are incomplete. We do not formally restrict t to be smaller than 2s, but for economic reasons and notational convenience we assume t ≥ s.
More generally, the horizontal product differentiation parameters t and s measure (inversely) the demand response to a change in price or quality, or how effectively a Þrm can change the mix of consumers (proportions of v L and v H consumers) by varying price and quality. We will use the transportation cost interpretation for the horizontal parameters throughout the paper to simplify exposition, but the reader should keep in mind the more general interpretation. In standard Hotelling models, the horizontal parameters determine Þrms' equilibrium proÞt margins. In our model, these parameters also will determine the extent of any equilibrium distortion, through their effects on Þrms' reactions to adverse selection.
We now describe the Þrms' cost structures. We assume that these Þrms are identical. The cost of supplying a unit of a good at a certain quality depends on the consumer characteristic v.
The cost of supplying a unit of good 1 at quality q 1 to a consumer with valuation parameter v i is
, where i = L, H. These cost functions are twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex. 8 We make Assumption (A1):
Similarly, the cost of supplying a unit of good 2 at quality q 2 to a consumer with valuation parameter
. Again, these cost functions are twice differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex, and we make Assumption (A2):
Assumptions (A1) and (A2) say that the cost functions are positively correlated with the preference parameter. 9 For later use, we now deÞne a few benchmarks, q * 1 , q * 2 , and q i * 1 , i = L, H, by the following:
These six values refer to various efficient quality levels for the two goods. The Þrst, q * 1 , refers to the efficient quality of good 1 with respect to the expected cost θc L (q 1 ) + (1 − θ)c H (q 1 ); q * 2 , the efficient quality of good 2 with respect to the expected cost θd L (q 2 ) + (1 − θ)d H (q 2 ). The others refer to the efficient qualities of the goods with respect to the speciÞc type of consumer preferences.
We assume that q L * 2 < q H * 2 so that the Þrst-best quality levels for good 2 are increasing with the valuations. 10
8 Alternatively, we could model the cost of providing quality as affecting Þxed costs. Our results would still hold if this were the case. 9 Cost correlation can be modeled explicitly. Let γ ij be the proportion of consumer who have cost function b c i for good 1 and preferences v j for good 2.
. The expected costs of providing L and H type consumers good 1 at quality We now interpret our model using the health care and school choice examples in the Introduction. First, we discuss the health care industry. Good 1 is general health care and good 2 is mental health care. Higher quality refers to better qualiÞed medical staff (such as specialists instead of general practitioners, and psychologists and psychiatrists instead of social workers for mental health services), and more timely processing of consumers' treatment requests, as well as better medical facilities. Our model says that all consumers have the same preferences regarding general health care quality, while some consumers value mental health care quality more (the type v H consumers). The cost of supplying a unit of general or mental health care at any given quality level depends on consumer characteristics. Some patients are more costly to treat than others because they will use more resources. According to Assumptions (A1) and (A2), this cost is higher for a type v H consumer. We can justify our assumptions by the following. Generally, more severely ill patients require more resources, and cost more to treat. 11 Suppose that a patient who suffers from a severe mental illness values the quality of mental health services more. Furthermore, suppose that severity between mental health and general health problems are positively correlated. Then our Assumptions (A1) and (A2) follow.
In the education market, good 1 is general education and good 2 is special education. Quality can be teacher qualiÞcations, student-teacher ratios, and educational resources such as books and computers. All parents prefer their children to have high quality general education. However, some children will beneÞt from special education more than others, and therefore some parents value special education more (those consumers with parameter v H ). 12 If children who need and value special education, such as remedial reading and math, will need more attention in their regular classes, then Assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. We assume, following the spirit of the voucher programs, that a school cannot reject any student who choose to enroll.
We examine two different strategy spaces for this game. In the Þrst, a Þrm can only offer a single quality level q i for each good that it produces. In many applications, Þrms may be unable 11 There is often an agency problem between an HMO or insurance company and a health care professional. Getting health care providers to ration care is difficult. The health care professional is trained to use all reasonable resources to treat patients. A provider's decision may also be affected by the potential of malpractice suit, professional code of ethics, and altruism for the patient. As a result, more seriously ill patients tend to use more resources. Moreover, due to common open enrollment practices, an HMO or insurance company must always accept membership from employees. Thus, adverse selection cannot be avoided even when consumer types are identiÞed.
to offer multiple quality levels. This may be true in health care: it can be very costly to provide different qualities of care to patients who are being treated in the same facility. Furthermore, some consumers may resent being treated as second-class customers if more than one service quality is provided. This may lower consumers' value for the Þrm's services. Finally, by offering different service qualities, a Þrm may increase the possibility for medical malpractice lawsuits. Obviously, if Þrms can only offer a single set of quality levels, they must only offer one set of prices for the goods. In the second game, Þrms may offer multiple quality levels. Here, Þrms can sell a good at different qualities and at different prices. In other words, although Þrms cannot observe consumers' characteristics, they may still implement self-selection among consumers by offering a menu of qualities and prices. Clearly, given that consumers' valuation of good 2 can only be either v L or v H , it is sufficient to let each Þrm offer at most two quality levels (with corresponding prices).
If the markets are separated (a carve out of market 2), then for each setup Þrms offer a quality and a price for each good and consumers can pick good 1 from one of the Þrms and good 2 from the other. Alternatively, one could think of there now being two Þrms at each location with one Þrm only providing good 1 and the other Þrm only providing good 2.
The timing of the game is the following. At stage 1, Þrms simultaneously choose the quality levels and prices. At stage 2, consumers observe the Þrms' choices and choose the bundle that gives them the highest utility level. We assume that for the parameters in the model, all consumers buy both goods in a symmetric equilibrium. 13 
Uniform Price and Quality Competition
In this section, a Þrm chooses a single quality level for each good that it produces. First, we examine the model when consumers must buy goods 1 and 2 from the same provider: the products are bundled. Next, we examine the model when a consumer can choose from different providers for each good. 13 We should note that a pure strategy equilibrium will always exist if only one quality level can be chosen by a Þrm. A pure strategy equilibrium may not exist if multiple quality levels are allowed due to the same arguments in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . We will assume that parameters of the model allow the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
Integrated Market
In integrated markets, the two goods are bundled. Suppose that Firm B chooses price p, and quality levels q 1 and q 2 for goods 1 and 2 respectively. If Firm A chooses price p, and quality levels q 1 and q 2 , then its demand from type v i consumers is
where i = L, H, while the demand functions for Firm B are 1 − x i . Since the probabilities of a consumer having valuations of v L and v H are respectively θ and 1 − θ, Firm A's expected proÞt function is
Firm A picks the price and qualities to maximize its expected proÞt, given Firm B's choices.
We look for a symmetric equilibrium, so we differentiate the above expected proÞt functions with respect to p, q 1 , and q 2 , set the Þrst order derivatives to zero, and then solve the equations by letting Þrms use the same strategy. After simpliÞcation, we obtain the following:
Equation (1) states that the equilibrium price is equal to total expected costs plus a markup of t.
This is a standard result in spatial differentiation models. From (1) and (2) we obtain
The equilibrium quality level q 1 equates the expected marginal cost of good 1 to its marginal value (which has been normalized at 1): equilibrium quality of good 1 is efficient with respect to the overall consumer population. For the equilibrium quality of good 2, we combine (1) and (3) to
By Assumptions (A1) and (A2), the term inside the curly brackets in (5) is positive. So quality is too low relative to the efficient level because the marginal costs are strictly convex functions of qualities. That is, in equilibrium,
Furthermore, the size of the distortion increases with the cost difference in supplying quality to v H and v L consumers, but falls with transportation cost parameter t. This will be important when comparing the differences in quality supplied across integrated and separated markets.
From Spence (1975) we know that generally quality in a market equilibrium will be efficient 
where x i , i = L, H, are the demands. There are two types of consumers but a Þrm sets a single price for the bundled good. For good 1, consumers' demands respond to a change in q 1 independently of their type. To see this notice that the last two terms of (6) are only weighted by each type's proportions in the market, θ and (1 − θ). Because of this independence, the relevant proÞt margin is still the difference between the bundled price p and the expected cost θc
This proÞt margin represents the return to investing in quality q 1 and the way to maximize proÞt by choosing q 1 proceeds in the same way as in the Spence class of models.
For good 2, a consumer's demand responds to a change in q 2 depending on whether it is a type v L or v H consumer: the last two terms of (7) have the type-dependent price-cost margin weighted by the respective valuations v L and v H times the proportions of the consumer types. In other words, the relevant proÞt margin is no longer the bundled price p less the expected cost θd
(as in (6)). By Assumptions (A1) and (A2),
that the proÞt margin associated with a type v H consumer is lower.
Consider the differences in marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between quality and income across consumer types. Each type has the same MRS with regard to good 1; thus there is no possible gain for a Þrm to discriminate on good 1. On the other hand, the v L type consumers have a lower MRS for good 2 than the v H consumers. Because a Þrm obtains a higher proÞt margin with the type v L consumers, it has an incentive to lower the good 2 quality level. The deviation would be proÞtable, since there would be a greater than (1 − θ) proportion reduction in the high cost v H consumers. In fact, an "optimal" deviation would have the Þrm also lowering its price. This can be seen in our model by noting that the equilibrium price is always equal to expected cost plus t the unit transportation cost. 14 In sum, letting equilibrium quality be q B i , we now state Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Under uniform price-quality competition in the integrated market (each Þrm offering uniform levels of quality of its goods to consumers), the equilibrium quality of good 1 is efficient,
, the equilibrium quality of good 2 is lower than the efficient level, q B 2 < q * 2 .
Our discussion of the intuition for Proposition 1 already indicates that as long as Þrms are unable to distinguish consumers who have heterogenous preferences on qualities, the incentives to choose quality for good 2 may be too low. Firms are unable to maximize proÞts by Þrst choosing the efficient level of quality and then extract the surplus by setting an appropriate level of price. 15 We now interpret our results regarding the school choice example in the Introduction. In order to explain the school choice example of cream skimming of low cost students by private schools not offering any special or gifted education programs, we have to make some slight modiÞcations to the model. Suppose Þrm A is a private school that can choose the levels of general education, good 1, and special education, good 2. Firm B is a public school which is required by law to offer the quality of special education of at least q 2 . Both schools receive a Þxed voucher for each student that enrolls in their school. Our interpretation of the facts that private schools offered no or limited special education is that given the voucher offered by the state, q 2 would be above the equilibrium choice for each school for special education. The private school would then choose the quality of special education that would be less than q 2 to push off the more costly students to the public schools. This will induce a disproportionate number of students that need special education to choose public schools. Furthermore, this will cause the average cost of educating a student in public school to be higher than in private school. This fact may cast some doubt on the claim that since private schools have lower costs of educating students and students get higher test scores in private schools, then public schools are less efficient than private schools.
The fundamental problem of adverse selection cannot be completely avoided even if the two goods are unbundled, because the heterogeneity of consumers will continue to exist. But will unbundling alleviate the extent of quality underinvestment in the market where consumers' preferences are heterogenous? We now turn to answer this question by analyzing equilibria of the separated markets.
Separated Markets
In this setting, a Þrm sells the two goods separately and at different prices. It is easy to show that the equilibrium quality of good 1 satisÞes equation (4) and is efficient for the population.
Furthermore, the equilibrium market price for good 1 is
. This is because consumers' preferences for quality of good 1 are homogeneous. We now turn to the equilibrium for good 2 when it is not bundled with good 1. equilibrium price. An earlier version of the paper derived the price that would implement the efficient quality for good 2. Note, however, that this price would push the quality of good 1 to be higher than the efficient level. Firm A's demand from types i consumers in market 2 is now
where p 2 and p 2 , are the prices set for good 2 by Firms A and B, respectively, and i = L, H. The proÞt function for Firm A in market 2 is
Again, we look for a symmetric equilibrium so we differentiate the proÞt function and set p 2 = p 2 and q 2 = q 2 . The Þrst-order derivatives with respect to p 2 and q 2 are:
Setting the above Þrst-order derivatives to zero to characterize the equilibrium price and quality:
By Assumptions (A1) and (A2), the last term of (11) is negative, and the quality of good 2 is again below the efficient level. The intuition follows from the discussion just before Proposition 1.
Because of the difference in demand responses from the two types of consumers, a Þrm's incentive to invest in quality is lower than the efficient level. 16 Now we compare the levels of quality across the integration and separation regimes. At a given quality of q 2 , the difference between the right-hand side expressions of equations (5) and (11), which characterize the integrated and separated market equilibrium good 2 quality levels, is
after dividing by a common factor
If (12) is negative, then the right hand side of (5) is less than θd 0
at the value of q 2 that makes the right hand side of (11) equal to θd 0
. Due to the convexity of the cost functions, the quality of good 2 must be lower when markets are integrated in this case.
Thus, the quality of good 2 is higher when the goods are separated than integrated if and only if
The numerator in each expression in (13) is the difference in costs of supplying quality to type v H and v L consumers. The higher this cost difference, the lower is the incentive for a Þrm to raise q 2 , since it will attract relatively more type v H than v L consumers. How much the market will respond to changes in quality and price is measured (inversely) by the transportation cost parameter. If t = s (perfect purchase scope economies), inequality (13) must hold, and the equilibrium quality of good 2 is closer to the efficient level when the markets are separated. As t grows relative to s (purchase economies becoming lower), then consumer demand is less responsive and the Þrm has a larger incentive to raise the quality of good 2. Since the left-hand side of inequality (13) decreases in t, the inequality may be violated eventually so that the equilibrium quality of good 2 may be lower when the markets are separated. Hence, whether the quality of good 2 is closer to the efficient level under integration or separation depends on the relative magnitudes of the parameters t and s.
We have thus identiÞed two countervailing effects at work when the markets are separated.
One, the cost effect, gives a Þrm an incentive upon separation to raise the quality of good 2 and attract more v H consumers because the adverse selection in good 1 is no longer present. Second, the purchase scope economies effect, gives a Þrm an incentive to lower the quality of good 2, because consumer demand is more responsive when s < t; by lowering q 2 , the Þrm gets a better mix of consumers. If the cost effect dominates, then there are information economies when markets are separated; if the purchase scope economies effect dominates then there are information diseconomies when markets are separated.
Let q S i denote the equilibrium quality in market i when the markets are separated. We collect our results for quality provision in Proposition 2
Proposition 2 Under uniform price-quality competition in the separated markets, the equilibrium quality of good 1 is efficient, q S 1 = q * 1 , and the quality of good 2 is too low relative to the efficient level, q S 2 < q * 2 . If t = s, then separating the markets results in a higher equilibrium quality of good
The positive difference between the good 2 equilibrium qualities in the separation and integration regimes decreases as t grows relative to s and it is possible that q S 2 < q B 2 .
Using the sum of consumer surplus and proÞts as a welfare measure, we next compare welfare across the integration and separation regimes. In equilibrium, the quality of good 1 is the same, so all that matters to welfare is the quality of good 2 and the consumers' transportation costs. We write down the welfare indexes in the integration and separation regimes, respectively:
The terms inside square brackets are welfare indexes from qualities; the other terms are due to transportation costs. Now, from Proposition 2, we know that when t = s quality is higher and closer to the efficient level under separation. Nevertheless, when t = s, the total transportation cost under separation is twice as much as under integration. If s and t are sufficiently small, then the gain in quality efficiency from separation must dominate the higher transportation cost.
From Proposition 2, as t grows the quality difference shrinks. Thus, if both t and s are large, the transportation costs grow under both regimes and the transportation cost can become the dominate welfare difference determinant. The welfare difference depends on both the relative and absolute magnitudes of t and s; we have just argued:
Corollary 3 Consider the uniform price-quality competition model. (i) There exist ² > 0 and δ > 0 such that for all t < ² and t − s < δ, welfare is higher under separation than integration.
(ii) There exist γ > 0 and ξ > 0 such that for all s > γ and t − s > ξ, welfare is higher under integration than separation.
Screening Price and Quality Competition
In this section, each Þrm is allowed to expand its strategy set by offering a set of price-quality combinations of each good to consumers. We will now see if the same effects arise as in the uniform quality model.
Integrated Markets
In this subsection, the two goods are bundled. Now, a Þrm can offer consumers two triples when competing against its rival. Firm A will offer a menu consisting of two sets of price-quality com-
Without loss of generality, let type v i consumers pick item (p i , q i 1 , q i 2 ), i = L, H, from the menu. For these choices to be optimal for consumers, the following two incentive compatibility constraints must hold:
Inequality (14) says that the type v L consumers will pick the item indexed by L; similarly, (15) states that v H will pick the item indexed by H. Suppose that Firm B offers the incentive-compatible
The Þrst-best qualities are characterized by the following Þrst-order conditions:
Can the efficient qualities be an equilibrium outcome when Þrms compete by offering menus of quality and price combinations? The key to this are the following properties of the Þrst-best qualities:
These respectively say that if each consumer pays the cost of production, then a type v L consumer will prefer to receive the goods with efficient qualities for type v L consumers, and vice versa for a type v H consumer. In other words, if (17) and (18) are satisÞed, and if there is a constant markup over costs as in our framework, then the Þrst best may be incentive compatible. In fact, the following is straightforward to prove:
Proposition 4 Under screening price-quality competition in the integrated market (each Þrm offering price-quality combinations of its goods to consumers), there is a symmetric equilibrium in (17) and (18) are satisÞed. That is, qualities of all goods are efficient, and the price-cost margin of each bundled good is t.
H if and only if inequalities
Under the conditions of Proposition 4, each type of consumer obtains the type-speciÞc, Þrst best, efficient qualities for both goods. In contrast, the efficient level of quality for good 1 in Propositions 1 and 2 only refers to one that maximizes q 1 − θc L (q 1 ) − (1 − θ)c H (q 1 ), the expected population surplus.
It is straightforward to show that (17) always holds. To see this note by deÞnition,
for all q 1 and q 2 . Thus, the above inequality implies (17) . On the other hand, inequality (18) may be violated. 17 By Proposition 4, if (18) is violated, then either (14), (15), or both bind. So now assume that (18) is violated.
In this situation, the symmetric equilibrium must be given by the solution of the maximization of (16) subject to (14) and (15) (after symmetry is imposed on the solution).
To proceed, we consider a relaxed program, (RP-H): the maximization of (16) subject to (15) and q L 2 ≤ q H 2 . In (RP-H), the incentive constraint (14) has been dropped. Obviously constraint (15) must bind in the solution of (RP-H); otherwise the allocation in Proposition 4 would be the solution to (RP-H), but this contradicts the assumption that (18) is violated. Moreover, when constraint (15) binds, the missing constraint (14) reduces to q L 2 ≤ q H 2 , so that the solution of (RP-H) is the solution of the original program of the maximization of (16) subject to (14) and (15) .
The solution of (RP-H) is characterized by the Þrst-order conditions after the strategies of the two Þrms are set to be identical. Letting λ be the Lagrangian multiplier for (15), we Þnd that qualities q L 1 , q H 1 , and q H 2 are all set at the efficient levels:
From λ > 0 and the convexity of d L , the quality of good 2 for type v L consumers will be too low. Also, because we assumed that q L * 2 < q H * 2 , the monotonicity requirement in program (RP-H),
, is satisÞed. The quality q L 2 being suboptimal is typical in adverse selection models: if the incentive constraint binds for a v H consumer, then a v L consumer's quality is depressed in order to satisfy the constraint optimally. Reducing q L 2 is superior to raising q H 2 : since v H > v L , lowering q L 2 from the efficient level introduces a second-order loss for type v L but a Þrst-order gain for fulÞlling the incentive constraint for type v H .
It will be useful to characterize the size of the distortion when we compare the equilibria of integrated and separated markets. Using (15) to substitute for p H in equation (21) and subtracting (20) from (21) we obtain
.
Using equation (19) to substitute out for λ we Þnd that
We can now state the following result.
Proposition 5 Under screening price-quality competition in the integrated market, if (18) is violated, the symmetric equilibrium is the solution to
and are efficient, while q L 2 is lower than q L * 2 and given by (22) The equilibrium prices are in (20) and (21) .
We have now completely characterized the symmetric equilibria when Þrms can compete by offering price and quality combinations to screen consumers. Comparing these results with those when Þrms compete with uniform price and quality, we see that the quality of good 1 is always efficient when screening is possible, but there are other kinds of distortions with respect to the quality of good 2. In the standard adverse selection model, a Þrm only has two instruments to discriminate against consumers: price and either the quality or quantity of the single good. In our multiproduct model, although a Þrm has three instruments, it is still impossible to use the quality of good 1 to lower type v H consumer's information rent; this is because preferences for good 1 are homogeneous across consumers. Nevertheless, because consumers' preferences on good 2 are heterogenous, any information consumers reveal through selecting items from a menu will indicate their types regarding their quality costs for good 1. As a result, the equilibrium quality of good 1 is always efficient with respect to each speciÞc type of consumers. Under uniform quality and price competition, the equilibrium quality of good 2 is always too low relative to the expected costs.
Under screening competition, equilibrium quality for good 2 may be fully efficient with respect to each type of consumers (when the Þrst best is an equilibrium), or it is too low for type v L consumers but efficient for type υ H consumers (when the Þrst best is infeasible due to the violation of (18)).
Separated Market
We now allow markets to be separated. In the last subsection, under integration and screening competition, each consumer always obtains his type-speciÞc efficient quality for good 1, q L * 1 or q H * 1 . Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that having good 1 efficient qualities remains an equilibrium allocation even when markets are separated. Consider a menu of price-quality pairs for good 1:
Because consumers have homogeneous preferences, all incentive constraints for truthful revelation must bind:
Nevertheless, the binding incentive constraints do not imply distortion in quality. In a truth-telling
Facing an opponent offering an incentive-compatible menu, Firm A chooses a menu to maximize
i subject to (23) . After symmetry is imposed on the solution, we have the symmetric equilibrium.
Before we present the equilibrium, we note that this equilibrium is somewhat unusual. Each consumer must be indifferent between all items if a Þrm offers a non-degenerate menu of pricequality pairs. In this equilibrium, a type v i consumer picks an optimal item that is also "labeled"
for that type. This allows us to construct an equilibrium with qualities speciÞcally efficient to the valuation types. Solving the Þrst-order conditions, we show that in the symmetric equilibrium the
Besides this "separating" equilibrium, there are other equilibria. 18 For example, there is a "pooling" equilibrium in which the qualities for both types are q * 1 ; this is supported by a consumer's strategy of always picking a Þxed item when a menu is offered-say, pick the Þrst of all optimal items. We study the separating equilibrium because it yields the highest social welfare.
What explains the type-speciÞc efficient qualities in the separating equilibrium? Because consumers have homogeneous preferences on good 1 quality, given any price pair, for incentive compatibility the difference between the qualities for the two types of consumers must be constant (see (23) ). Raising or reducing this difference will not relax any incentive constraint. Due to the linearity of the demand functions and the Spence argument, a Þrm has an incentive to set quality to the type-speciÞc efficient level in the separating equilibrium, and in that equilibrium, a Þrm must use distorted prices to satisfy the incentive constraint (23). This explains why p H 1 is higher than the expected price-cost margin of s, while p L 1 is lower. The equilibrium expected proÞt for each Þrm is exactly the same as if consumers' types were known to the Þrm. 
As in the integrated market, the properties of the Þrst-best good 2 qualities will be key for characterizing the equilibria. Consider the following two inequalities:
They correspond to (17) and (18), and say that if a consumer is asked to pay for the cost, then a type i consumer will prefer the type speciÞc efficient quality. It is straightforward to prove the following proposition. 18 We thank a referee for pointing out these possibilities.
Proposition 6 Under screening price-quality competition in market 2, there is a symmetric equilibrium in which each Þrm offers the price-quality menu
, q H * 2 )} if and only if inequalities (26) and (27) hold.
If (17) (18), (26) and (27) are all satisÞed, then market equilibria under integration and separation will yield the same proÞle of (efficient) qualities of good 2 to consumers. As in the earlier discussion, inequality (26) is always satisÞed, while inequality (27) may be violated. The analysis for the case in which (27) is violated proceeds in a fashion parallel to that in the previous subsection, and we will be brief. For completeness, we will write down Þrm A's proÞt function when it
If (27) is violated, then using the same arguments in Proposition 5, the symmetric equilibrium is given by the solution to the maximization of (28) subject to the binding constraint (25) , and
; the other incentive constraint (24) is slack. The equilibrium quality of good 2 for consumers with valuation v H remains efficient at q H * 2 , while q L 2 is below the efficient level, and it is the solution to
We summarize the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Under screening price-quality competition in market 2, if (27) is violated in the symmetric equilibrium, quality q H 2 = q H * 2 , while quality q L 2 < q L * 2 and is given by (29) .
Before we compare the equilibrium quality levels across regimes, we point out that whether an incentive constraint binds when markets are integrated or separated does not depend on the transportation cost parameters t and s; this can be seen by examining inequalities (17) , (18), (26) , and (27) . The transportation cost parameters only affect the level of distortion if an incentive constraint binds: see Propositions 5 and 7.
The key to comparing equilibrium qualities across the integration and separation regimes lies in the interdependence between the incentive properties of the Þrst best in these two regimes. In fact, inequalities (26) and (27) are obtained respectively from inequalities (17) and (18) by subtracting the possible surpluses of good 1. But the magnitudes of these surpluses depend on the consumer's type:
; so inequality (26) implies inequality (17) , while inequality (18) implies inequality (27) . This asymmetry is crucial because the equilibrium qualities are given by constrained maximizations. So switching between regimes may make constraints more or less stringent. 19 We are now in the position to show Corollary 8 Suppose that the equilibrium is given by Proposition 7 (so that inequality (27) is violated under separation). Then there exists ² > 0, such that switching the regime from separation to integration results in less efficient qualities in good 2 for all consumers if t − s < ².
In this case, inequality (27) being violated implies that (18) is also violated, so the switch of equilibria is from Proposition 7 when the markets are separated to Proposition 5 when markets are integrated. To compare the distortions across the two regimes in this situation, take the difference between the right-hand sides of (22) and (29):
which is negative for s = t because the Þrst-best surplus of good 1 for type v L consumers is larger than that for type v H . Thus, for s = t Þrms will distort q L 2 less when markets are separated. So there are information economies for good 2 when markets are separated and t = s. This is because only the cost effect is present when t = s. Nevertheless, the quality q L 2 is decreasing in t due to the purchase economies of scope effect. If t is large enough, (30) may become positive (similar to the case of uniform price-quality competition above) and there are information diseconomies when separating good 2.
In the previous corollary, the binding incentive constraint was the same whether markets are integrated or separated. Now we examine the opposite case where an incentive constraint may be completely relaxed due to a regime change.
Corollary 9
Suppose that the equilibrium is given by Proposition 5 (so that inequality (18) is violated under integration). Then switching the regime from integration to separation may result in the Þrst best; if the Þrst best is not an equilibrium under separation, then there exists ² > 0, such that the quality of good 2 is more efficient for all consumers if t − s < ².
Separation makes it more likely that (27) can be satisÞed. Thus, if (18) is violated when the markets are integrated, then there are two possibilities when markets are separated. If (27) is still violated, then the distortion for v H consumers is smaller by expression (30) when t is not excessively bigger than s. If both (26) and (27) are slack, then each type of consumers obtains the efficient quality of good 2; see Proposition 6. Corollary 9 describes a situation where separation must improve quality efficiency.
Finally, we compare the difference in welfare when an integrated market is switched to a separated market. Since q L 1 , q H 2 and q L 2 are efficient in both regimes, we need only examine the quality q H 2 and the transportation costs for welfare comparisons. With one important exception, our conclusions are the same as in the uniform quality-price competition model. First, we discuss the similarities. Suppose that both (18) and (27) are violated, so that q H 2 is less than the efficient level in both regimes. As in the uniform model, if the transportation costs are sufficiently small, the quality distortion effect dominates the difference in transportation costs. From Corollary 8, if t and s are close to each other, quality q H 2 is more efficient under separation than integration; if t is much larger than s, than the reverse conclusion is possible. If both t and s are quite large, then the quality distortions are small relative to the transportation costs. We summarize these arguments in Corollary 10 Consider the screening price-quality competition model and suppose that both (18) and (27) are violated. (i) There exist ² > 0 and δ > 0 such that for all t < ² and t − s < δ, welfare is higher under separation than integration. (ii) There exist γ > 0 and ξ > 0 such that for all s > γ and t − s > ξ, welfare is higher under integration than separation.
Finally, welfare comparisons in the screening competition model may be qualitatively different from the uniform competition model. This is due to the fact that the Þrst best is possible under screening competition. If both (18) and (27) are satisÞed, then the quality of q H 2 , along with the other quality levels, are efficient under both regimes. Welfare is then decided solely by transportation costs. Nevertheless, it is possible that inequality (18) may be violated while (27) holds. Then q H 2 becomes Þrst best only if the markets are separated (see Corollary 9) . Using similar arguments as in Corollary 10 we obtain Corollary 11 Consider the screening price-quality competition model. (i) If both (18) and (27) are satisÞed, then welfare is higher under integration than separation if and only if t ≤ 2s.
(ii)
If (18) is violated but (27) is satisÞed, welfare is higher under separation than integration when 2s ≤ t; also, there exists γ > 0 and ξ > 0 such that for all s > γ > t/2 and t − s > ξ, welfare is higher under integration than separation.
Conclusions
We have analyzed a model where Þrms compete across multiple dimensions to attract consumers when adverse selection and correlation are present. Our focus was on whether separating markets improved or reduced the quality efficiency of the goods. We identiÞed two countervailing effects that affected the equilibrium quality in both models: the cost effect and the purchase economies of scope effect. Under both uniform and screening competition, if there are large purchase economies of scope, then separation improves the quality of the good where consumers have heterogenous preferences. If the purchase economies of scope are small, then separation may reduce the quality when consumers have heterogenous preferences. Furthermore, separating markets does not change the quality of a good when consumer preferences are identical. We also examined the welfare difference under integration and separation of markets. If the purchase economies of scope are large and the transportation costs are small, then welfare is typically higher when markets are separated.
On the other hand, when the purchase economies of scope are small and the transportation costs are high, typically welfare is higher when markets are integrated.
Our model does present some complicated issues for policy analysis. In practice, a change in market structure is often accompanied by many other policy instruments. For example, in the Massachusetts mental health and substance abuse carveout, tight price regulations, together with health-care provider networks and managed care were introduced simultaneously with the carveout.
See Ma and McGuire (1998) for more details. These other policy instruments perhaps represent the recognition that a change in market structure alone may have complex welfare implications.
Some recent work in health economics has shown that insurance premium should be adjusted for individual risk characteristics to reduce the adverse selection problem (see Cutler and Reber (1998) and Glazer and McGuire (1999) ). Our analysis is complimentary to this work. One could interpret our work as showing that if risk adjusted premiums are used to reduce the adverse selection problem, then separating the market may reduce insurance costs.
One way to obtain efficiency in the school choice example is to raise the voucher price for all students so that the private school has the incentives to raise the quality of special education.
Another, less costly plan would be to give higher vouchers to students who are designated as needing special education. A third alternative is to mandate minimum requirements for special education programs for a private school to be eligible for a voucher. Finally, special and general education programs could be unbundled; students can receive the two services from different providers. This may be very impractical, since there may be large economies of scope for providing all of a student's educational needs at one location or by one provider.
